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Abstract (149/150) 
There is currently little direct evidence regarding the function of subjective confidence in decision 
making: The tight correlation between objective accuracy and subjective confidence makes it difficult to 
distinguish each variable’s unique contribution. Here, we created conditions of a perceptual decision task 
that were matched in accuracy but differed in subjective evaluation of accuracy, by orthogonally varying 
the strength versus variability of evidence. Confidence was reduced with variable (vs. weak) evidence, even 
across conditions matched for difficulty. Building on this dissociation, participants (N = 20) could choose 
to seek further information before making their decision. The data provided clear support for the hypothesis 
that subjective confidence predicts information seeking in decision making: Participants were more likely 
to sample additional information before giving a response in the condition with low confidence, despite 
matched accuracy. In a preregistered replication (N = 50), these findings were replicated with increased 
task difficulty levels. 
 
Introduction 
People make finely calibrated evaluations of their own performance. In perceptual decision tasks, 
for example, subjective confidence correlates closely with objective accuracy (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; 
Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010), indicating that confidence reflects a direct (albeit imperfect) 
readout of decision processes (De Martino, Fleming, Garrett, & Dolan, 2013; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; 
Pasquali, Timmermans, & Cleeremans, 2010). However, the role of decision confidence in adaptive 
behavior remains unclear. In the memory literature, confidence is thought to serve as a teaching signal 
during self-regulated learning (Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013; Butler & Winne, 1995; Metcalfe & Finn, 
2008). Recent theoretical accounts indeed stress the importance of decision confidence in making 
predictions, learning from mistakes, and planning subsequent actions in the absence of feedback (Meyniel, 
Sigman, & Mainen, 2015; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). However, there is little direct empirical evidence 
for this hypothesized role of confidence in adaptive decision making.  
Animal studies suggest that low confidence motivates exploration before committing to a decision 
(Call & Carpenter, 2000) or opting-out of difficult decisions with low expected payoff (Foote & Crystal, 
2007; Hampton, 2001; Smith et al., 1995). However, this interpretation remains controversial because 
decision accuracy and confidence are typically highly correlated: When evidence clearly favors one option, 
performance and confidence will both be high; when evidence is equivocal, accuracy will fall and 
confidence will be low. Thus, confidence and performance might be separate—but correlated—expressions 
of evidence quality (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009). For example, a recent study suggested that confidence in a 
decision can affect trade-offs between speed and accuracy in a subsequent decision (van den Berg et al., 
2016a), but the authors inferred confidence from a combination of accuracy, reaction time and evidence, 
thus confounding confidence with evidence quality. In studies like these, it is therefore difficult to 
determine whether confidence is explicitly represented and causally influences decision making, or whether 
apparent adaptive behaviors are driven by lower-level processes such as associative learning to avoid 
contexts with low evidence quality (Le Pelley, 2012). Crucially, to provide evidence for the former, one 
needs to demonstrate that confidence predicts strategic decision making while controlling for objective 
performance (as a proxy for evidence quality). 
Importantly, variations in confidence within a single condition are not informative in this respect, 
because these can still be driven by variations in evidence quality (e.g., due to fluctuations in attention paid 
across trials; Macdonald, Mathan, & Yeung, 2011). What is needed, therefore, is to induce differences in 
confidence between conditions that are matched for accuracy. To accomplish this, the current study builds 
on recent work dissociating accuracy and confidence using perceptual decision tasks that orthogonally 
manipulate strength and reliability of evidence (de Gardelle & Summerfield, 2011). In these tasks, 
participants perform categorical judgments on multi-item displays (e.g., judging the average color of 8 
different-hued items as red or blue). The task is difficult when mean evidence is close to the decision 
boundary (i.e., average color is purplish rather than clear red or blue) and when evidence is highly variable 
(i.e., the items comprise various red and blue hues). Crucially, evidence variability influences subjective 
confidence more strongly than does evidence mean (Boldt, de Gardelle, & Yeung, 2017; Spence et al., 
2015): Even when performance is matched across conditions with weak versus variable evidence, 
participants are systematically less confident when variability is high. Here we leverage this dissociation to 
test the hypothesis that strategic information-seeking behavior—specifically, requesting additional 
evidence before committing to a decision—is predicted by subjective confidence rather than simple 
evidence quality as reflected in objective accuracy. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty participants (seven men, mean age: 23.7 years, SD = 3.1, range 20 - 31) took part at the 
University of Oxford for monetary compensation (£8 plus up to £4.92 dependent on performance, range of 
the rounded actual payments: £10 - £12). Participants were tested individually, and all provided written 
informed consent. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive with 
respect to the hypothesis. The sample size was chosen because in a previous study this number proved 
effective in revealing the effect of variance on confidence (Boldt et al., 2017). In that study, the difference 
in confidence between the two medium difficulty conditions computed on all trials (see below) produced a 
large effect size (N = 20, Cohen’s d = 1.19), which gives the current study, given N = 20, strong power of 
.99 to detect this. All procedures were approved by the local ethics committee.  
 
Stimuli and apparatus 
Stimuli were presented on a gray background on a 20-inch CRT monitor with a 75 Hz refresh rate, 
using the MATLAB toolbox Psychtoolbox3. Each stimulus comprised eight colored shapes spaced 
regularly around a fixation point (radius 2.8° visual arc). The mean color of the eight shapes was 
determined by the variable C; the variance of C across the eight shapes by the variable V. Mean color 
varied between red ([1, 0, 0]) and blue ([0, 0, 1]) by following a linear transition in RGB space ([C,0, 1 
−C]). At the start of the experiment, C could take four different values: 0.450, 0.474, 0.526 and 0.550 (from 
blue to red, with 0.5 being the category boundary), and V could take two different values: 0.0333 and 
0.1000 (low and high variability, respectively). On each trial, the color of each individual element was 
pseudo-randomly selected with the constraint that the mean and variability of the eight elements closely 
matched the values of C and V. Each combination of the C and V values occurred equally often. Four 
conditions were thus created with different levels of difficulty (see Figure 1B): an easy condition (high 
mean – low variance), two medium conditions (low mean – low variance and high mean – high variance) 
and a hard condition (low mean – high variance). The individual elements did not vary in shape. All 
responses were made using a USB mouse. 
 
Procedure 
Figure 1A shows an example experimental trial during the main part of the experiment. The 
stimulus was flashed for 200ms, followed by a fixation point for 200ms. There followed a choice phase 
consisting of two equally frequent conditions: free choice or forced choice. On free choice trials, the letters 
R and S (or S and R; counterbalanced across participants) appeared flanking the fixation cross. Participants 
could either choose to request additional evidence by seeing the stimulus again in an easier version (S), or 
to give their response (R). They indicated their choice by clicking the corresponding mouse button. On 
forced choice trials, only an R appeared, and participants were forced to select the option to give their 
response. When participants chose to see the stimulus again, the values of the stimulus were slightly altered 
so that the mean was higher (C’ = C +/- .01) and the variability lower (V’ = V -.0167). They were then 
presented with a fixation point for 400ms, the easier stimulus for 200ms and a fixation point for 400ms. 
When participants opted (or were forced) to give their response without seeing the stimulus again, they 
simply viewed the fixation point for the same total amount of time (1000ms). Afterwards, a vertical 
response scale appeared (9.0° high and 0.4° wide) with a slider (0.1° high and 0.4° wide) in the center. The 
top of the bar was labelled as ‘sure blue’, the bottom as ‘sure red’ (counterbalanced across participants). 
Participants moved the cursor with their mouse to indicate jointly their response and their level of 
confidence, and confirmed by pressing the space bar. The location of the slider on the scale was translated 
into a numerical score, ranging from -50 (sure blue) to +50 (sure red), with every three screen-pixel (0.09°) 
increment resulting in a difference of one confidence point. No response could be given when the cursor 
was exactly in the middle (0 on the scale), so participants were forced to make the categorical judgment 
between red or blue. They were instructed to make this judgment at their own pace, and accuracy was 
stressed. Accuracy for each trial was scored as a binary variable. Confidence was scored as the absolute 
value on the response scale. To account for between-participant variation in use of the confidence scale and 
drift in confidence judgments over the course of the experiment, ratings were z-scored separately for each 
participant and each block. 
Participants gained 5 points for correct answers and lost 5 points for errors. They could win up to 
an additional £4.92 by scoring points (650 points = £1). Crucially, choosing to see the stimulus again in an 
easier version costs 1 point, giving participants an incentive to ask for the hint only when the benefit of 
doing so (in terms of increasing the probability of making a correct choice) would outweigh this cost. 
Participants were explicitly instructed that they could score more points by strategically using the see again 
option. Participants were not rewarded for the accuracy of their confidence ratings. 
The main part comprised 9 blocks of 64 trials, with balanced numbers of trials for each 
combination of mean, variance and trial type (free choice vs. forced choice), in pseudo-randomized order. 
Each block started with 8 additional practice trials in which the choice phase was omitted and participants 
received auditory feedback on the accuracy of their responses. This was done to maintain a stable color 
criterion over the course of the experiment. Before the main part of the experiment, several practice blocks 
were administered. In the first block (64 trials), participants practiced the color judgement task with no 
choice phase and a binary judgment (i.e., the slider could only take three positions, namely centered, up or 
down, both 2.3°), with auditory feedback to signal decision accuracy. In blocks 2-6 (64 trials each), 
participants jointly indicated their response and their level of confidence, using the continuous response 
scale. No feedback was delivered during these blocks, which served to familiarize participants with the 
confidence rating scale and to allow staircase-based matching of the difficulty of the two medium difficulty 
conditions, as described below. Finally, practice block 7 was identical to the main part of the experiment. 
 
 Figure 1. A. Example of an experimental trial during the main experiment. After being presented 
with the stimulus, on half of the trials participants chose either to see the stimulus again in an easier 
version (by clicking S) or to give their response (by clicking R). These constitute the free choice trials. One 
the other half of the trials, participants could only choose to give their response (i.e., forced choice trials). 
Then, participants jointly indicated their response and level of confidence on a vertical continuous 
response scale.  B. The four conditions that were created by crossing mean and variance, in order of 
increasing difficulty. Note that only four out of eight possible trial types are shown, because each condition 
equally often appeared with red and blue as the correct answer.  
 
To match performance between the two medium conditions (i.e., high mean – high variance and 
low mean – low variance), C levels in the low mean condition were adaptively changed. At the end of 
blocks 2 – 6, C was adjusted whenever the two medium conditions (16 trials per condition) were not 
matched in accuracy. In blocks 8 – 16, the change in C was based on the accuracies of the preceding two 
blocks of the forced choice trials only (16 trials per condition). The magnitude of the change depended on 
the size of the difference. If there was a difference in error rate of at least 6%, 10% or 15%, C values of the 
low mean condition were adjusted by 0.0005, 0.0012 or 0.0025, respectively. Inspection of the data 
revealed that overall the C values in the low mean condition at the end of the adaptive staircase procedure 
(M = .526 for ‘red’ stimuli, range: .518 to .534) did not differ from the value that was chosen at the start of 
the experiment (.526), |t| < 1, BF = .241. 
                                                          
1 Because the default frequentist approach to statistics does not allow to interpret null effects, we additionally calculated a Bayes 
Factor (BF) in R using the BayesFactor package (Morey & Rouder, 2014) and the BayesMed package for correlations (Nuijten, 
Wetzels, Matzke, Dolan, & Wagenmakers, 2015), using the default priors. BFs for ANOVA’s were calculated using a model 
comparison approach. Compared to classical p-values, a BF has the advantage that it can dissociate between data in favor of the null 
hypothesis (BF < 1/3), data in favor of the alternative hypothesis (BF > 3) and data that is uninformative (BF ≈ 1).  
 Results 
Decision accuracy 
Decision accuracy was computed based on the data of the forced choice trials (ignoring the level 
of subjective confidence), and submitted to a 2 (mean: low or high) by 2 (variance: low or high) repeated 
measures ANOVA. The 95% confidence intervals were computed after logit transforming the data, and 
were then transformed back. Replicating earlier reports (Boldt et al., 2017; de Gardelle & Summerfield, 
2011), both mean, F(1,19) = 125.06, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.87, BF = 7.65e+09, and variance, F(1,19) = 77.15, p 
< .001, ηp2 = 0.80, BF = 3.03e+10, affected accuracy, and there was a reliable interaction between the two 
factors, F(1,19) = 37.73, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.66, BF = 674. Accuracy was highest in the easy condition (M = 
97.7%, CI95% [98.7, 99.8]) and lowest in the difficult condition (M = 75.2%, CI95% [71.0, 82.1]). Crucially, 
follow-up contrasts focusing on the two medium difficulty conditions revealed that accuracy was 
effectively matched across the low mean – low variance and high mean – high variance conditions: M = 
91.6%, CI95% [90.3, 95.3], versus M = 91.1%, , CI95% [90.0, 95.7], |t| < 1, BF = .26. Thus, our staircase 
procedure was successful in creating two conditions that were matched in terms of objective accuracy 
(Figure 2A). See Table 1 for a summary of all the dependent variables in this experiment, split over the 
different conditions. Given that the task was unspeeded, we did not observe any reliable differences in 
reaction time, all Fs < 1, all BFs < .33. 
 
Confidence judgments 
Next, the data of forced choice trials were used to examine how subjective confidence related to 
accuracy, how mean and variance influenced subjective confidence, and whether subjective confidence was 
as predicted reduced in the high mean – high variance condition compared to the low mean – low variance 
condition, despite their matched performance.  
Confidence resolution. Participants tended to be more accurate when they expressed higher levels 
of confidence. Logistic regression models were fitted for each participant separately predicting accuracy 
based on the level of confidence, and positive significant slopes were observed for all fits, all ps < .017. To 
examine whether these results hold when controlling for difficulty, the factors evidence mean (high or low) 
and variance (high or low) were additionally entered into the regression. Again, positive slopes for 
confidence were observed for all fits, and these were significantly different from zero for 18 out of 20 
participants. Correspondingly, after dividing trials into quintile bins according to confidence (for each 
participant separately) we observed a monotonic increase in accuracy with level of confidence (Figure 2B). 
Average Confidence. The effect of mean and variance on z-scored confidence ratings was assessed 
on the data of the forced choice trials using a 2 (mean: low or high) by 2 (variance: low or high) repeated 
measures ANOVA. Here we report the results of confidence on all trials. The results for correct trials only, 
which did not differ materially from those reported here, can be found in the Supplementary Materials. 
Both evidence mean, F(1,19) = 152.60, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.89, BF = 8.44e+08, and variance, F(1,19) = 53.64, 
p < .001, ηp2 = 0.74, BF = 1.25e+17, influenced confidence ratings. There was also a significant interaction 
between these factors, but the Bayes factor indicated weak ability to reject the null, F(1,19) = 9.89, p = 
.005, ηp2 = 0.34, BF = 0.75. Confidence was highest in the easy condition (M = 0.52, CI95% [0.39, 0.65]) 
and lowest in the hard condition (M = -0.63, CI95% [-0.77, -0.50]). Crucially, as predicted, and replicating 
findings from Boldt et al. (2017), confidence ratings were significantly lower in the high mean – high 
variance condition (M = -0.27, CI95% [-0.37, -0.17]), than the low mean – low variance condition (M = -
0.02, CI95% [-0.11, 0.08]), t(19) = 3.22, p = .004, BF = 10 (Figure 2C). Despite matching for difficulty, 
individual differences in confidence between the two conditions did not reliably correlate with individual 
differences in accuracy between them, r(18) = .20, p = .400, BF = .24. 
 
 
Figure 2. A. First-order task performance, irrespective of the level of confidence, calculated from 
forced choice trials. The staircase procedure was successful in matching objective accuracy in the high 
mean – high variance and the low mean – low variance conditions.  B. Distribution of objective accuracy 
as a function of confidence, calculated from forced choice trials. C. Mean of standardized confidence, 
calculated from forced choice trials. D. Percentage of trials where participants chose to give their response 
rather than to see the stimulus again, separately for each category, calculated from free choice trials. 
Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
 
Information seeking 
On free choice trials, participants on average chose to the see the stimulus again in an easier 
version on 37.9% of the trials. There was considerable variability between participants in this percentage 
(range 9% - 80%), but this did not correlate reliably with individual differences in overall mean confidence 
on forced choice trials, r(18) = -.26, p = .268, BF = .31, or accuracy on forced choice trials, r(18) = .24, p = 
.299, BF = .29.  
To examine how evidence mean and variance influenced strategic information-seeking behavior, 
the percentage of see again choices in free choice trials was calculated separately for each trial type and 
then subjected to a 2 (mean: low or high) by 2 (variance: low or high) repeated measures ANOVA. 
Mirroring the results of the confidence judgments, effects of both mean, F(1,19) = 71.46, p < .001, ηp2 = 
0.79, BF = 2.25e+05, and variance, F(1,19) = 82.23, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.81, BF = 4.78e+13, were significant, 
but with no interaction, F < 1, ηp2 = 0.04, BF = 0.39. As expected, in the difficult condition participants 
asked to see the stimulus again on a majority of these trials (M = 59.9%, CI95% [47.0, 72.8]) whereas in the 
easy condition this occurred rarely (M = 14.0%, CI95% [5.7, 22.3]). Crucially, and as predicted, participants 
more often chose to see the stimulus again in the high mean – high variance condition (M = 45.8%, CI95% 
[32.1, 59.5]), that was associated with lower confidence ratings, compared to the low mean – low variance 
condition (M = 32.1%, CI95% [19.8, 44.5]), t(19) = 6.23, p < .001, BF = 3749 (see Figure 2D). This finding 
proved to be highly robust, with 19 out of 20 participants showing the pattern. Moreover, the one 
participant who requested to see the stimulus again more often in the low mean – low variance condition 
also expressed lower confidence in this condition compared to the high mean – high variance condition. 
Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 3, there was a trend correlation across participants between differences in 
confidence on forced choice trials and differences in see again choices across the two medium difficulty 
conditions, r(18) = .42, p = .063, CI95% [-.02, .73], BF = 0.95. However, this relation should be cautiously 
interpreted given that the Bayes Factor indicates that these data are uninformative. 
Importantly, it should be ruled out that participants more often chose to view the stimulus again in 
the high mean – high variance condition than in the low mean – low variance condition, simply because it 
was more helpful to do so for these trials. To this end, we compared these two conditions for see-again 
trials only. Due to a lack of at least 10 trials in one of these cells, only 13 participants were included in this 
analysis. Crucially, after participants asked to see the stimulus again, accuracy still did not differ reliably 
between the two medium difficulty conditions, t(12) = -1.45, p = .17, BF = .65. If anything, accuracy was 
numerically lower in the high mean – high variance condition (M = 96.2%, CI95% [93.4, 98.8]) than the low 
mean – low variance condition (M = 97.5%, CI95% [95.1, 99.9]). This result remained unchanged when 
including the seven participants who had fewer than 10 trials in one of the cells, |t| < 1, BF = .25. These 
findings argue strongly against the possibility that participants’ chose to see the stimulus again more often 
in the high mean – high variance condition because it was more useful to do so than in the low mean – low 
variance condition. 
 
 
Figure 3. Scatterplot showing the relationship between the difference scores for the two medium 
conditions for confidence judgments and see again choices. 
 
Metacognitive ability 
We next performed exploratory analyses to investigate whether the impact of evidence variability 
on confidence judgments and see again choices relates to individual differences in metacognitive ability. 
Based on the data from forced choice trials we computed M-ratios (Fleming & Lau, 2014) to quantify the 
efficiency with which each participant’s confidence ratings discriminated between their correct and 
incorrect responses (so-called meta-d’) while controlling for their first-order performance (d’). When this 
ratio is 1, all available first-order information is used in the confidence judgment. When the ratio is smaller 
than 1, metacognitive sensitivity is suboptimal, meaning that not all available information from the first-
order response is used in the metacognitive judgment (Fleming & Lau, 2014). Averaged across conditions, 
mean d’ was 2.58 (SD = .65), and mean meta-d’ was 1.76 (SD = .63), giving a ratio meta-d’/d’ of 0.69 (SD 
= .26). Interestingly, individual differences in meta-d’/d’ ratio were positively correlated with differences in 
confidence between the two medium conditions, r(18) = .72, p < .001, CI95% [.42, .88], BF = 109, as well as 
with differences in see again choices between these conditions, r(18) = .49, p = .028, CI95% [.06, .77], BF = 
1.88 (Figure 4). Thus, the influence of evidence variability on subjective confidence and strategic 
information seeking was more profound in participants with good metacognitive ability. However, our 
sample size was not chosen to test this specific question and these analyses were performed in an 
exploratory rather than hypothesis-driven fashion. Therefore, a high-powered replication of these 
correlations is necessary to evaluate their robustness. 
 
       
Figure 4. Relationship between metacognitive ability, quantified as meta-d’/d’, which was 
calculated from forced choice trials, and the difference between the two medium condition in both 
confidence judgments (A) and see again choices (B), which were both calculated from the free choice 
trials. 
 
A unique contribution of confidence 
The previous results are consistent with the hypothesis that choices to sample more information 
are driven by subjective confidence, not by performance. To provide further support for this interpretation, 
we fitted mixed regression models to demonstrate that confidence predicts information seeking over and 
above measurable factors, and we performed a causal mediation analysis to test whether the influence of 
evidence variability on see again choices is mediated by subjective confidence. For both analyses, for each 
participant we computed (i) mean confidence based on the forced-choice data, (ii) the proportion of see 
again choices based on the free choice data, and iii) mean accuracy based on the forced-choice data, 
separately for the factors evidence variability (high or low), evidence mean (high or low), and color (red or 
blue). Values were calculated separately for each color to partition the data in a more fine-grained manner, 
but this variable was not taken into account in the analyses. For ease of interpretation, low variability and 
high mean were dummy coded as reference categories so that a positive effect of each factor corresponds to 
an increase in difficulty. 
To demonstrate that confidence has a unique influence on see again choices over and above the 
other experimental factors, we fitted a mixed regression model predicting see again choices by confidence, 
evidence variability, mean evidence and mean accuracy (using the lme4 package; Bates, Maechler, Bolker, 
& Walker, 2015). Random slopes were added for confidence, variance and their interaction, because this 
significantly increased the fit compared to a model without random slopes. Degrees of freedom were 
estimated using Satterthwaite’s approximation. As predicted, confidence (β = -.16), t = -4.13, p < .001, 
variance (β = .20), t = 9.02, p < .001, and mean (β = .09), t = 4.97, p < .001, all affected see again choices, 
whereas mean accuracy did not, p > .67. This regression analysis clearly demonstrates that confidence 
predicts information seeking over and above performance.  
Subsequently, we used causal mediation analyses to test whether the effect of variance on see 
again choices is mediated by confidence. First, a mediator mixed model was fit predicting mean confidence 
by variance (2 levels: high or low), mean (2 levels: high or low) and mean accuracy, with random slopes 
for variance. Second, an outcome mixed model was fit predicting the proportion of see again choices by 
mean confidence, variance (2 levels: high or low), mean (2 levels: high or low) and mean accuracy, with 
random slopes for mean confidence and variance. A mediation analyses was then performed based on these 
two models (using the mediation package; Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014), testing 
whether the influence of variance on see again choices is mediated by confidence, conditional on evidence 
mean and mean accuracy (a more detailed explanation can be found in the Supplementary Materials). The 
results showed that from the total effect of variance on see again choices (β = .277, CI95% [.207, .350]), p < 
.001, there was 44.6% of total variance that was mediated by confidence (β = .125, CI95% [.066, .200]), p < 
.001 (see Figure 5). This finding suggests that confidence is a crucial mediator between evidence variability 
and see again choices, although we acknowledge that mediation analysis is a correlational technique and 
therefore cannot provide ultimate evidence for causality (but see Supplementary Materials for further 
analysis that supports our interpretation). 
 
 
Figure 5. A. Regression coefficients obtained from the mediation and the outcome mixed 
regressions models fit to the data of Experiment 1. Note: *** = p < .001. Degrees of freedom for 
calculating significance are based on Satterthwaite’s approximation. B. Causal mediation analysis. Error 
bars reflect quasi-Bayesian 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Comparing forced choice and free choice trials 
A final set of analyses focused on possible performance benefits (or costs) of information seeking. 
As a manipulation check, we first confirmed that the opportunity to see the stimulus again led to improved 
performance and increased confidence. Simple t-tests revealed that participants were on average more 
accurate (M free choice – forced choice = 3.5%, CI95% [1.9, 5.2], t(19) = 4.59, p < .001, BF = 151) and more 
confident (M free choice – forced choice = 0.23, CI95% [0.14,0.33], t(19) = 5.30, p < .001, BF = 616) in the free 
choice condition (in which they could choose to see the stimulus again) compared to the forced choice 
condition. In relation to these findings, we note that free choice trials are more demanding than forced 
choice trials. Free choice trials constitute a dual task situation (two choices have to be made) whereas in 
forced choice trials only one decision has to be made. Although a dual task would typically reduce 
performance, and thus cannot account for the increase in performance and confidence in the free choice 
condition, it remains possible that confidence and accuracy might be affected in other ways by this 
difference in demand.    
Focusing on the medium difficulty conditions, the data further showed that the increase in 
accuracy in free choice trials relative to forced choice trials was larger for the high mean – high variance 
condition (M free choice – forced choice = 4.4%, CI95% [2.2, 6.6]) than for the low mean – low variance condition (M 
free choice – forced choice = 2.1%, CI95% [-0.2, 4.3], F(1,19) = 5.07, p = .036, BF = 1.78, although the Bayes Factor 
indicated weak evidence. This observation reflects the fact that participants more often requested to see the 
stimulus again in the high mean – high variance condition, and as reported above, seeing the stimulus again 
increases performance. If this conjecture is true, the performance difference between trials in which 
participants waived the see again option versus forced choice trials (which are identical in terms of visual 
input) should be larger for the high mean – high variance condition than for the low mean - low variance 
condition. This is because participants were less confident in the high mean – high variance condition, so 
they needed to be more accurate on average before turning down the option of seeing the stimulus again. 
First, we confirmed that indeed overall performance was better on trials were participants waived the 
option of seeing the stimulus again (M = 94.0%, CI95% [91.2, 96.9]), compared to forced decision trials (M 
= 88.9%, CI95% [86.4, 91.4]), t(19) = 5.07, p < .001, BF = 394 (for a similar finding in monkeys, see 
Hampton, 2001). Importantly, as predicted, this difference was larger for the high mean – high variance 
condition (M choose to respond – forced decision = 4.3%, CI95% [1.6, 7.0]), than for the low mean – low variance 
condition (M choose to respond – forced decision = 1.6%, CI95% [-0.8, 4.0]), F(1,19) = 6.22, p = .022, ηp2 = 0.25, BF = 
2.67. 
The above analyses suggest that participants indeed strategically used the option to receive 
additional evidence to increase their performance. Additional evidence increased performance more in the 
high mean – high variance condition than in the low mean – low variance condition, because in the former 
condition participants were less confident and thus more willing to ask for additional evidence. This pattern 
was not observed for confidence judgments: The increase in confidence on free choice trials over forced 
choice trials was not different between the two medium difficulty conditions, F < 1. Likewise, participants 
were more confident when they turned down additional evidence in the free choice condition (M = 0.29, 
CI95% [0.16, 0.42]) compared to being forced to respond (M = -0.10, CI95% [-0.14, -0.06]), t(19) = 5.21, p < 
.001, BF = 524, but this increase did not differ reliably between the two medium difficulty conditions, 
F(1,19) = 1.22, p = .283, ηp2 = 0.06, BF = 0.39. In sum, these additional analyses demonstrate that 
participants indeed strategically used the see again option to increase their performance.
Table 1.  
Summary of the dependent variables separated by condition. Numbers between brackets represent standard deviations.  
Experiment 1  
 high mean – low variance low mean – low variance high mean – high variance low mean – high variance  
Accuracy (%) forced choice 97.69 (5.3) 91.56 (5.2) 91.12 (6.2) 75.19 (9.3)  
Accuracy (%) free choice 98.5 (4.4) 93.6 (7.5) 95.5 (5.0) 82.1 (10.7)  
Confidence (z) forced choice (all trials) 0.52 (0.28) -0.02 (0.21) -0.27 (0.22) -0.64 (0.29)  
Confidence (z) forced choice (corrects) 0.53 (0.27) 0.07 (0.21) -0.21 (0.22) -0.56 (0.27)  
Confidence (z) free choice (all trials) 0.65 (0.30) 0.23 (0.25) 0.03 (0.22) -0.38 (0.28)  
Confidence (z) free choice (corrects) 0.67 (0.27) 0.28 (0.24) 0.05 (0.21) -0.26 (0.29)  
See again (%) free choice (all trials) 14.0 (17.8) 32.1 (26.4) 45.8 (29.3) 59.9 (27.6)  
See again (%) free choice (corrects) 14.0 (22.2) 32.4 (33.9) 45.9  (34.3) 59.9 (35.9)  
  
Experiment 2  
 high mean – low variance low mean – low variance high mean – high variance low mean – high variance  
Accuracy (%) forced choice 87.0 (9.2) 72.9 (7.6) 73.0 (8.4) 62.2 (7.6) 
Accuracy (%) free choice 90.3 (6.7) 79.8 (11.3) 79.8 (10.8) 68.9 (10.9) 
Confidence (z) forced choice (all trials) 0.04 (0.30) -0.11 (0.32) -0.17 (0.27) -0.21 (0.29) 
Confidence (z) forced choice (corrects) 0.08 (0.30) -0.07 (0.32) -0.09 (0.27) -0.16 (0.32) 
Confidence (z) free choice (all trials) 0.17 (0.35) 0.06 (0.33) -0.04 (0.26) -0.11 (0.25) 
Confidence (z) free choice (corrects) 0.20 (0.35) 0.09 (0.33) -0.00 (0.26) -0.06 (0.27) 
See again (%) free choice (all trials) 32.5 (24.0) 38.9 (24.7) 45.4 (26.7) 47.3 (27.1) 
See again (%) free choice (corrects) 33.0 (24.7) 40.8 (24.9) 47.7 (25.5) 50.1 (27.8) 
Experiment 2: Preregistered replication 
Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the results of Experiment 1, with an increased sample size and 
with increased task difficulty to address possible concerns about ceiling effects in accuracy (accuracy on 
see again choices in the critical medium difficulty conditions exceeded 96% in Experiment 1). The 
experimental protocols and all analyses were preregistered on the Open Science Framework. The 
replication specifically enabled us to evaluate the robustness of individual difference correlations observed 
in Experiment 1, now using a sample size appropriately powered for these analyses.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Following Simonsohn (2015), we increased our sample size by a factor of 2.5 (equaling N = 50). 
This ensured 80% power to reject the null hypothesis that effects observed in Experiment 1 were too small 
to detect with that sample. This new sample size provides strong power (.96) to detect the correlation 
reported in Figure 4B. After replacing the data from one participant who stopped halfway through the 
experiment, fifty participants from the Free University of Brussels (seventeen men, mean age = 20.1 years, 
SD = 2.7, range 18 – 29, seven left-handed) took part in return for course credit and additional monetary 
compensation depending on performance (range €1 – €3.7). Participants were tested in groups of five 
people at most, seated in individual cubicles. They provided written informed consent. All participants 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive with respect to the hypothesis. All 
procedures were approved by the local ethics committee. 
 
Stimuli, apparatus and procedure 
Stimuli, apparatus and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, except that new mean color (C) 
values were chosen at the start of the experiment to increase task difficulty. Specifically, values were 
chosen so that the two medium difficulty conditions were slightly more difficult than the hard condition of 
Experiment 1, aiming for an accuracy level in these conditions of 70-75%. Thus C could now take four 
different values: 0.470, 0.485, 0.515 and 0.530 (from blue to red, with 0.5 being the category boundary).  
 
Results 
Decision accuracy 
Decision accuracy was computed based on the data from forced choice trials (ignoring the level of 
subjective confidence), and submitted to a 2 (mean: low or high) by 2 (variance: low or high) repeated 
measures ANOVA. Both mean, F(1,49) = 432.52, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.90, BF = 6.96e+33, and variance, 
F(1,49) = 214.92, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.81, BF = 2.34e+33, affected accuracy. Although there was a significant 
interaction between the two factors, F(1,49) = 5.68, p = .021, ηp2 = 0.10, BF = 1.58, the Bayes Factor 
indicated that the data were uninformative on this point. Accuracy was highest in the easy condition (M = 
87.0%, CI95% [87.0, 91.7]) and lowest in the difficult condition (M = 62.2%, CI95% [60.2, 64.7]). Note that 
the interaction between mean and variance was much weaker than the interaction reported in Experiment 1 
(where ηp2 = 0.66), and was over- rather than under-additive. In Figure 2a it can be seen that there was a 
clear ceiling effect in the high mean – low variance condition of Experiment 1, which might be the cause of 
this interaction. Visual inspection of Figure 6a demonstrates that this ceiling effect was effectively dealt 
with in Experiment 2 by increasing the difficulty of the task. Crucially, follow-up contrasts focusing on the 
two medium difficulty conditions revealed that accuracy was effectively matched across the low mean – 
low variance and the high mean – high variance conditions: M = 72.9%, CI95% [71.3, 75.8], versus M = 
73.0%, CI95% [71.4, 76.3], |t| < 1, BF = .15. On average, C values in the low mean condition at the end of 
the experiment (M = .515 for ‘red’ stimuli, range: .502 to .528) did not differ from the value that was 
chosen at the start of the experiment (Mred = .515), |t| < 1, BF = .16. Given that the task was unspeeded, we 
did not observe any reliable differences in reaction time, all ps > .157, all BFs < .55. 
 
Confidence judgments 
Confidence resolution. Logistic regression models were fitted for each participant separately 
predicting accuracy based on the level of confidence. Positive slopes were observed for 47 out of 50 fits, 
however, these were only significant for 29 participants (p < .05), whereas they did not reach significance 
(p > .05) for the other 21 participants. When the factors mean (high or low) and variance (high or low) were 
additionally entered into the regression, positive slopes for confidence were observed for 47 out of 50 
participants. For seventeen participants these were significant (p < .05) in the expected direction. On the 
group level, after dividing trials into quintile bins according to confidence (for each participant separately), 
we observed a monotonic increase in accuracy with the level of confidence (Figure 6B). 
Average Confidence. The effect of mean and variance on z-scored confidence ratings was assessed 
on the data of the forced choice trials using a 2 (mean: low or high) by 2 (variance: low or high) repeated 
measures ANOVA. Here we report the results of confidence on all trials; the results for correct trials only, 
which did not differ materially from those reported here, can be found in the Supplementary Materials. 
Both mean, F(1,49) = 31.17, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.39, BF = 322, and variance, F(1,49) = 22.67, p < .001, ηp2 = 
0.32, BF = 3.23e+07, influenced confidence ratings. There was also a significant interaction between these 
factors, F(1,49) = 14.28, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.22, BF = 1.82, although the evidence was weak. Confidence was 
highest in the easy condition (M = 0.04, CI95% [-0.04, 0.12]) and lowest in the hard condition (M = -0.21, 
CI95% [-0.29, -0.13]). As predicted, confidence ratings were numerically lower in the high mean – high 
variance condition (M = -0.17, CI95% [-0.25, -0.09]), than the low mean – low variance condition (M = -
0.11, CI95% [-0.20, -0.01]), but the effect was only marginally significant in a two-tailed contrast, t(49) = 
1.79, p = .079, BF = 0.67 (Figure 6C), perhaps due to greater between-subject variability in confidence 
judgments in this experiment with an overall more difficult version of the task (see Supplementary 
Materials). When we analyzed median confidence, as suggested by a reviewer, the difference in confidence 
between the two medium difficulty conditions was clearer: t(49) = 2.44, p = .018, BF = 2.27. Finally, 
individual differences in confidence between the two conditions did not reliably correlate with individual 
differences in accuracy between them, r(48) = .15, p = .296, BF = .19. 
 
Figure 6. A. First-order task performance, irrespective of the level of confidence, calculated from 
forced choice trials. The staircase procedure was successful in matching performance across the high 
mean – high variance and the low mean – low variance conditions.  B. Distribution of objective accuracy 
as a function of confidence, calculated from forced choice trials. C. Mean of standardized confidence, 
calculated from forced choice trials. D. Percentage of trials where participants chose to give their response 
rather than to see the stimulus again, separately for each category, calculated from free choice trials. 
Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
 
Information seeking 
On free choice trials, participants on average chose to the see the stimulus again in an easier 
version on 41.0% of the trials. This rate is similar to that observed in Experiment 1 (37.9%), and once again 
there was considerable variability between participants in this percentage (range 1.5% - 96.5%), that did 
not correlate reliably with individual differences in overall mean confidence on forced choice trials, r(48) = 
-.12, p = .388, BF = .16, or accuracy on forced choice trials, r(48) = -.03, p = .816, BF = .11.  
To examine how evidence mean and variance influenced strategic information-seeking behavior, 
the percentage of see again choices in free choice trials was calculated separately for each trial type and 
then subjected to a 2 (mean: low or high) by 2 (variance: low or high) repeated measures ANOVA. Effects 
of both mean, F(1,49) = 28.830, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.37, BF = 95, and variance, F(1,49) = 46.65, p < .001, ηp2 
= 0.49, BF = 2.40e+14, were significant, as well as the interaction between the two factors, F(1,49) = 9.99, 
p = .003, ηp2 = 0.17, BF = 1.47, although the evidence for the latter was weak. As expected, in the difficult 
condition participants asked to see the stimulus again most frequently (M = 47.3%, CI95% [39.6, 55.0]), 
whereas in the easy condition this occurred less often (M = 32.5%, CI95% [25.7, 39.4]). This difference was 
consistently observed, though numerically it was much smaller than in Experiment 1, where the task was 
easier overall and where see again choices were less evenly distributed across conditions. Crucially, 
replicating Experiment 1, participants more often chose to see the stimulus again in the high mean – high 
variance condition (M = 45.4%, CI95% [37.8, 52.9]), compared to the low mean – low variance condition 
(M = 38.9%, CI95% [31.9, 46.0]), t(49) = 4.47, p < .001, BF = 468 (see Figure 6D). Moreover, there was a 
reliable correlation across participants between differences in confidence and differences in see again 
choices across the two medium difficulty conditions, r(48) = .36, t(48) = 2.65, p = .011, CI95% [.08, .58], BF 
= 2.78 (Figure 7). Interestingly, although not designed with this contrast in mind, the data of Experiment 2 
provide further support for a coupling between confidence and information seeking in relation to the 
contrast between the two high variance conditions. In particular, whereas the high mean – high variance 
and the low mean – high variance conditions show marked and highly consistent differences in accuracy, 
t(49) = 11.60, p < .001, BF > 5.64e+12 (Figure 6a), there was only inconclusive evidence for a difference 
in see again choices between the two conditions, t(49) = 1.868, p = .067, BF = 0.76 (Figure 6d). Consistent 
with our proposed coupling between confidence and information sampling, confidence also differed only 
modestly between these conditions, t(49) = 2.58, p = .013, BF = 3.04, (Figure 6c). 
To rule out that participants more often choose to view the stimulus again in the high mean – high 
variance condition than in the low mean – low variance condition simply because it was more helpful to do 
so for these trials, we compared these two conditions for see-again trials only. Due to a lack of at least 10 
trials in one of these cells, only 42 participants were included in this analysis. Crucially, after participants 
asked to see the stimulus again, accuracy still did not differ reliably between the two medium difficulty 
conditions, |t| < 1, BF = .25 (high mean – high variance condition: M = 86.0%, CI95% [82.4, 89.6]; low 
mean – low variance condition: M = 84.1%, CI95% [79.9, 88.4]). 
 
 Figure 7. Scatterplot showing the relationship between the difference scores for the two medium 
conditions for confidence judgments and see again choices. 
 
Metacognitive ability 
We next investigated whether the impact of evidence variability on confidence judgments and see 
again choices relates to individual differences in metacognitive ability. Averaged across conditions, mean 
d’ was 1.30 , CI95% [1.17, 1.43], and mean meta-d’ was 0.50, CI95% [0.39, 0.62], resulting in a ratio meta-
d’/d’ of 0.41, CI95% [0.32, 0.49]. Contrary to the results of exploratory analyses in Experiment 1, individual 
differences in meta-d’/d’ ratio did not correlate reliably with differences in confidence between the two 
medium conditions, r(48) = .08, p = .585, CI95% [-.20, .35], BF = .13, nor with differences in see again 
choices between these conditions, r(48) = .14, p = .323, CI95% [-.14, .40], BF = .18 (Figure 8). This lack of 
correlation did not result from the reduced correspondence between confidence and accuracy compared to 
Experiment 1 (see confidence resolution): both correlations were far from significant in the subset of 29 
participants for whom confidence significantly predicted accuracy (correlation involving the difference 
scores for confidence: r(27) = -.16, p = .41, BF = .20, and the correlation involving the difference scores for 
see again choices:  r(27) = -.15, p = .43, BF = .20).    
 
 
 Figure 8. Relationship between metacognitive ability, quantified as meta-d’/d’, which was 
calculated from forced choice trials, and the difference between the two medium condition in both 
confidence judgments (A) and see again choices (B), which were both calculated from the free choice 
trials. 
 
A unique contribution of confidence 
The same mixed regression model as in Experiment 1 was fit to the data, with random slopes for 
confidence, variance and accuracy. Similar to Experiment 1, confidence (β = -.10), t = -4.47, p < .001, 
variance (β = .07), t = 5.24, p < .001, and accuracy (β = .12), t = 3.91, p < .001, all affected see again 
choices, whereas evidence mean did so less consistently, p = .084. This finding demonstrates that 
confidence predicts see again choices over and above the other experimental variables. 
To perform the same causal mediation analysis as in Experiment 1, the same two mixed models 
were fit to the data, with random slopes for the factor variance in the mediator model, and random slopes 
for confidence, variance and accuracy in the outcome model. The results showed that from the total effect 
of variance on see again choices (β = .084, CI95% [.055, .110]), p < .001, there was 17.7% of total variance 
that was mediated by confidence (β = .015, CI95% [.007, .023]), p < .001, conditional on mean accuracy and 
evidence mean (see Figure 9). Thus, similar to Experiment 1, this finding is in line with our hypothesis that 
confidence mediates between evidence variability and see again choices.  
 
 Figure 9. A. Regression coefficients obtained from the mediation and the outcome mixed 
regressions models fit to the data of Experiment 2. Note: *** = p < .001. Degrees of freedom for 
calculating significance are based on Satterthwaite’s approximation. B. Causal mediation analysis. Error 
bars reflect quasi-Bayesian 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Comparing forced choice and free choice trials 
As a manipulation check, we again confirmed that the opportunity to see the stimulus again led to 
improved performance and increased confidence. Simple t-tests revealed that participants were on average 
more accurate (M free choice – forced choice = 5.92%, CI95% [4.58, 7.26], t(49) = 8.90, p < .001, BF = 1.09e+09) 
and more confident (M free choice – forced choice = 0.13, CI95% [0.08,0.17], t(49) = 6.02, p < .001, BF = 67299) in 
the free choice condition (in which they could choose to see the stimulus again) compared to the forced 
choice condition. Contrary to Experiment 1, however, the increase in accuracy in free choice trials relative 
to forced choice trials was not different between the high mean – high variance (M free choice – forced choice = 
6.73%, CI95% [4.57, 8.89]) and the low mean – low variance (M free choice – forced choice = 6.74%, CI95% [4.23, 
9.25]) conditions, |t| < 1, BF = .15. This observation is noteworthy, because even though participants more 
often requested to see the stimulus again in the high mean – high variance condition, and seeing the 
stimulus again improved performance, this did not improve accuracy more than it did so in the low mean – 
low variance condition. Also the increase in confidence in free choice relative to forced choice trials was 
not different between the two medium difficult conditions, t(49) = -1.34, p = .18, BF = .36. 
We further found that performance was better on trials in which participants waived the option of 
seeing the stimulus again (M = 77.7%, CI95% [74.8, 80.7]), compared to forced decision trials (M = 73.8%, 
CI95% [71.8, 75.8]), t(49) = 4.57, p < .001, BF = 629. However, again unlike the results of Experiment 1, 
this was not different between the two medium difficulty conditions, F < 1, ηp2 < .01, BF = 0.15 (high mean 
– high variance condition: M choose to respond – forced decision = 4.4%, CI95% [1.3, 7.4], t(49) = 2.91, p = .005, BF = 
6.38; low mean – low variance  condition: M see again – forced decision = 4.1%, CI95% [1.4, 6.8], t(49) = 3.02, p = 
.004, BF = 8.27), perhaps reflecting the more even distribution of see again choices across conditions in 
this experiment with a more difficult task overall. The same pattern was observed for confidence 
judgments. Participants were more confident when they waived additional evidence in the free choice 
condition (M = 0.03, CI95% [-0.06, 0.12]) compared to being forced to respond (M = -0.11, CI95% [-0.18,-
0.04]), t(49) = 4.14, p < .001, BF = 173, but this increase did not differ reliably between the two medium 
difficulty conditions, F(1,49) = 1.80, p = .185, ηp2 = 0.03, BF = .17. 
 
 
Discussion 
This study provides novel evidence that subjective confidence influences strategic decision 
making, such that people seek further information when they lack confidence in an initial choice. Our 
critical manipulation was to contrast conditions matched for objective accuracy but differing in confidence, 
thus breaking the confound between confidence and objective evidence quality that complicates most 
existing paradigms. Crucially, participants solicited additional information before committing to a decision 
more often in a condition with high evidence variance (associated with lower confidence) than a condition 
with low mean (associated with higher confidence), despite matched objective accuracy. 
Models of decision making and confidence 
The dominant characterization of decision making is in terms of continuous accumulation of 
evidence (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). Notably, in this framework, deciding whether 
to sample more information from the environment before committing to a decision depends primarily on 
whether the level of accumulated evidence has reached a predefined threshold. It has been argued that 
confidence can also be understood as reflecting the accumulated evidence for a decision (Kiani & Shadlen, 
2009; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010), with dissociations between confidence and accuracy thought to arise 
because confidence judgments are typically collected only after a decision has been made (Van Den Berg et 
al., 2016b) allowing time for further evidence accumulation after the initial choice (Resulaj, Kiani, 
Wolpert, & Shadlen, 2009; Moran, Teodorescu, & Usher, 2015). This explanation, however, cannot explain 
the dissociation between confidence and accuracy reported here, because responses were unspeeded and 
participants provided their decision and confidence judgments in a single response. 
In the present study, two conditions were created that were matched for accuracy but differed in 
subjective confidence: Confidence was lower in a condition with high evidence variability relative to a 
condition with low evidence mean. This observation is already difficult to interpret within evidence 
accumulation models, which predict a close link between accuracy and confidence (see Yeung & 
Summerfield, 2012, for discussion). However, our crucial observation was that the decision to seek more 
information tracked subjective confidence, not objective accuracy: Participants consistently chose to see the 
stimulus again more often when evidence variability was high than when evidence mean was low. This 
effect was observed in two experiments differing markedly in overall task difficulty, in datasets collected in 
different experimental settings, attesting to the robustness of the effect. The effect varied systematically 
across individuals according to the sensitivity of their confidence judgments to evidence variability. 
Thus, the decision whether or not to sample more information related to subjective evaluations of 
accuracy, rather than objective performance. As such, our findings indicate a distinction between systems 
representing the decision variable that underpins choice (e.g., Donner, Siegel, Fries, & Engel, 2009), and 
systems that compute confidence based on a noisy read-out of these decision processes (De Martino et al., 
2013). Indeed, our findings are naturally explained by theories assuming that confidence depends on 
computations that are at least partly distinct from those guiding the initial choice, with potential input from 
other sources of information (Pasquali et al., 2010). Our results indicate a role for these metacognitive 
computations in adaptive behavior (Meyniel et al., 2015), in line with findings that choices made with low 
confidence are less likely to be repeated (Folke, Jacobsen, Fleming, & De Martino, 2016) and have less 
influence on decisions whether or not to switch environments (Purcell & Kiani, 2016). 
The present study exploited a previously observed effect of evidence variability to dissociate 
objective accuracy from subjective confidence, without specifically aiming to understand the cause of this 
dissociation. Nonetheless, in replicating previous findings using the same paradigm (Boldt et al., 2017) and 
related manipulations (Spence et al., 2015), our results stand in apparent contrast to recent findings that 
evidence mean more strongly influences choice and confidence than evidence weight (Kvam & Pleskac, 
2016). In that study, however, evidence weight was operationalized as the amount of evidence, as distinct 
from the variability of presented evidence studied here. Given this difference, it is difficult to compare 
Kvam & Pleskac’s findings to ours. Future work could usefully attempt to unravel the interplay between 
evidence mean, weight and variability in shaping decisions, confidence and information seeking. 
The importance of replication 
In Experiment 1, we observed a correlation between individual differences in metacognitive ability 
and our key effects. However, the sample size was not chosen to examine correlations, and caution is 
warranted in drawing conclusions from such exploratory analyses (Lindsay, 2015). Moreover, whereas 
Experiment 1 had high power to detect confidence differences between the two medium difficulty 
conditions (.99), it had much lower power to detect the observed correlations (e.g., power of .62 for the 
correlation in Figure 4B). In light of concerns that exploratory studies with low experimental power are 
prone to false positive findings, it is notable that the correlations observed in Experiment 1 were not 
replicated in our high-powered preregistered replication, despite its increased statistical power. It is 
therefore unlikely that the significant correlations reported in Experiment 1 are meaningful (Simonsohn, 
2015). Overall, these findings highlight how good research practice can help to shed better light on the 
robustness of effects, using high-powered preregistered replications to rigorously examine key findings 
(here: the influence of confidence on decision making) and examine the validity of effects observed in 
exploratory analyses. 
Limitations 
We interpret our findings as showing that confidence influences strategic information seeking. 
However, an alternative interpretation is that confidence and information seeking are only indirectly linked 
via their relationship with a third, correlated variable. Specifically, as suggested by a reviewer, it could be 
that high variance stimuli have two separate effects: reducing confidence and cueing the need to seek 
further information (cf. Le Pelley, 2012). As described above, our data favor the former interpretation 
because confidence strongly mediates the relationship between evidence variability and information 
seeking, and confidence explains differences in information seeking over and above effects of evidence 
variability. This mediation effect is far from trivial, given that the values for confidence and see again 
choices are based on different parts of the data (forced choice versus free choice), and that see again 
choices are sampled earlier in time than confidence judgments. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that our 
results cannot conclusively rule out the latter account. However, converging conceptual considerations 
strongly favor our interpretation. In particular, our account is consistent with the foundational hypothesis 
that confidence (like other metacognitive representations) supports adaptive behaviors that are flexible and, 
crucially, generalizable: Any factor that decreases confidence can produce the same adaptive behavior of 
information seeking. In contrast, the alternative account provides no account of why confidence should be 
explicitly represented and, crucially, suggests an account of adaptive behavior that is implausibly rigid: It 
implies that people would need to learn separately to seek information in an indefinitely large number of 
conditions: not only when evidence variability is high, but also when evidence mean is low, stimulus 
presentation is brief, lighting conditions are poor, attention has waned, etc. Thus, for example, this 
hypothesis cannot explain the finding in our data that subjective confidence likewise mediates the 
relationship between mean evidence and information seeking (see Supplemental Materials), a finding that 
falls out naturally from our interpretation. 
Although we argue that our interpretation in terms of confidence provides the most parsimonious 
explanation of our data, we acknowledge that deeper understanding of the mechanisms by which evidence 
variability affects confidence will be important to further our understanding of this effect, for example by 
ruling out that the dissociation between confidence and accuracy emerges from differences in scale-
dependent interactions (Wagenmakers, Krypotos, Criss, & Iverson, 2012). Similarly, future work might 
usefully investigate how seeing additional evidence affects performance. Although we found that additional 
evidence was equally informative in both medium difficulty conditions, this could only be examined when 
participants actively chose to sample more information. By introducing a condition where participants are 
forced to sample more evidence on some trials, it could be examined whether the value of additional 
evidence depends on the degree of variability. More generally, this might help to shed light on the question 
whether our proposed link between evidence variability, confidence and information seeking is adaptive, or 
a suboptimal bias.  
 
Conclusion 
In the current study, subjective confidence was dissociated from decision accuracy. This enabled 
us to show that the strategic choice to seek information before committing to a decision is determined by 
the subjective evaluation of accuracy, as reflected in confidence ratings, rather than by objective accuracy. 
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